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Introduction 
 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding most of the terms used in this study, which 
are discussed in the first section, this chapter attempt to identify the interactions, 
the interferences and interdependencies that exist between the external policies 
of France, and the external policies of Europe towards Latin America. When 
examined over the course of an extensive period, four distinctive phases can be 
observed:  
The first one fits into an upload perspective, as France tried to pressure the 
EEC into acting on behalf of French strategic interests on the international stage 
in Latin America. In this scenario, Latin America became a ready back up for 
French politics; a “reservoir de votes” to dip into during multilateral interactions. 
This understanding, initiated by de Gaulle, has always existed. But his 
successors quickly realized the impossibility in the long run of establishing a third 
channel between the East and the West loyal to the French president’s original 
vision. Thus, a second phase, during the time period that stretches from Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing’s term in 1974, France progressively understood that as a 
smaller power, it would be unable to spearhead alone a policy on the 
international front. As a consequence, France was left attempting to influence 
European decisions in the direction of its own agenda: that is, building a 
multipolar world. The emphasis in relation to Latin America was put on two fronts: 
promoting the presence of French multinational firms in the region, and cultural 
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policy. The rest, particularly trade policy, was unavoidably done within the EEC 
framework. 
A third distinct period spans across the Presidencies of François Mitterrand 
(1981-1995) added a special feature: France asserted its commitment to the 
construction of Europe, and when Spain and Portugal joined the EEC in 1985, 
ushered in a wave of change. Latin America progressively became important to 
the attempt of European countries to construct a common European foreign 
policy. Through the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which defined 
the CFSP as one of the three fundamental pillars of the new Europe, Spain and 
Portugal in fact played important roles in the consolidation of European-Latin 
American relations.1 The summit bringing together leaders of EU-LAC States has 
taken place every other year since 1999, and a “Latin American policy” has 
progressively been taking shape at the European level.  
The fourth period, corresponding to Jacques Chirac’s presidencies (1993-
2007), France successfully imposed (uploaded) the enforcement of customs 
within the CAP while negotiating with external partners. Starting in the early 90s, 
negotiations with the MERCOSUR have therefore always been tense (with the 
tacit agreement of Spain).  France also managed to upload its preferences in 
other areas of the EU’s relations with Latin America, like the intergovernmental 
format of EU-LAC summits, and an emphasis on technical and education 
cooperation. However, in relation to the Iraq war, France did not manage to 
impose its views to the rest of the EU, as CFSP unity broke down entirely, 
although he managed to keep his country’s independent stance against the US, 
to the relief of some in Latin America.  
Some of the foundations of the currently in place since Nicolas Sarkozy 
came to power in 2007, were actually set during Jacques Chirac’s second 
mandate (2002-2007). In these years, France has decided to step away from 
                                                 
1
 Numerous Spanish and Portuguese high-ranking public servants held positions in 
European organizations. Javier Solana from Spain, NATO’s former Secretary General, was 
nominated High Representative of the European Union for the CFSP in 1999, the year Europe 
decided to establish a “strategic partnership” with Latin America. On this subject see Manuel 
Alcantara and Maria Salvadora Ortiz (ed.), Relacines entre América latina y Europa : balances y 
perspectivas, Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2008. See also the chapter on 
Spain in this book. 
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Latin-America as a whole, and refocused its bilateral efforts on specific countries 
that it deems essential, both to its economic interests and its political strategies: 
Brazil and Mexico. For relations with the rest of the region, France has 
progressively delegated cooperation policy to the European Union, in what can 
be characterized as a sort of outsourcing. This strategy was initiated in the mid-
90s. In the context of French declining power and with the creation of numerous 
cooperative programs between Europe and Latin America implemented by 
Spanish and Portuguese governmental officials of the European Commission, 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs encouraged diplomats to utilize these 
programs in order to avoid duplication of European efforts, in a process that 
could be broadly characterized as download. Today, we can observe a sharp 
decline in France’s engagement towards bilateral French and Latin American 
relations (particularly in terms of credits afforded to scientific, cultural, and 
technical cooperation), relations that had survived many highs and lows during a 
half a century of existence. Despite the protests sometimes expressed by 
political officials, this turn towards disengagement is probably irreversible. 
 
 
 
1. Conceptual considerations 
 
  1.1. The concept of Europeanization and French foreign policy 
 
The “europeanization” of national politics within the European Union has 
been the focus of many studies and has generated a great deal of interest. This 
europeanization has considerably affected the definition of internal public 
policies2. One of the main features of the Union is the production of norms that it 
                                                 
2
 Litterature on the subject is very prolific. The most famous is the CAP and the budgetary 
constraints imposed by Maastricht. But most of the state’s realm of action focuses on food, 
energy, transportation, work rights, health, environment, etc. Refer to Cowles (M. Green), 
Caporaso (James), Risse (Thomas) eds., Transforming Europe. Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2001. 
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 4 
“imposes” on its members, who are obliged to enforce them as internal law3, 
under penalty of, either fines, imposed by the Commission, or of sanctions 
decided by the European Court of Justice. In France for example, it is said that 
more than 80% of the laws adopted by the Parliament were originally developed 
in Brussels. 
The bottom-up and top-down concepts, also known as upload and 
download, have thereby been elaborated in an attempt to analyze the relation 
between national and European politics. These two perspectives underline the 
necessity of analyzing both dimensions of policy-making, from bottom-up and 
top-down, in order to fully grasp the complexity and various levels of the process. 
This dual perspective is particularly explicit in most of the studies that focus on 
economic relations outside of the European Union (EU), whether these studies 
have been commissioned by international organizations (CEPAL, SELA, OECD, 
etc), specialized research groups and centers (CELARE, OBREAL, OIRLA, etc)4 
or universities5. 
The idea of the europeanization of national foreign policies towards Latin 
America is based on the premise that a “European Foreign Policy” exists and that 
it is sufficiently powerful to interact with, if not to directly influence, national 
foreign policies. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss here in detail the 
theoretical framework of foreign policy-making and the multiplicity of the various 
actors in a field which includes numerous and increasing dimensions: bilateral 
political relations, economic relations, trade flows, cultural cooperation, 
development cooperation, positioning in international organizations or in large 
                                                 
3
 Laïdi (Zaki), La norme sans la force, l’énigme de la puissance européenne, Paris, 
Presses de Sciences Po, 2005. 
4
 CEPAL : Comisión Económica para América Latina ; SELA : Sistema Económico 
Latinoamericano ; OECD : Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ; 
CELARE : Centro Latinoamericano para las Relaciones con Europa; OBREAL : Observatorio de 
Relaciones Europa América Latina ;  OIRLA : Observatorio Integración Regional 
Latinoamericana. Many studies have been undertaken by these research centers. Go to their 
respective websites for more details. 
5
 See for example Ghymers (Christian), Quenan (Carlos), Romero (Antonio), ed., 
Relaciones América latina y el Caribe – Union Europea : analisis y perspectivas », Caracas, 
ediciones del SELA, 2008 ; Ghymers (Christian), Quenan (Carlos), « Las relaciones América 
latina y el Caribe – Union Europea : hacia la VI Cumbre birregional de Madrid », SELA, février 
2010 ; Santiso (Javier), Amérique latine, Révolutionnaire, libérale, pragmatique, Paris, 
CERI/Autrement, 2005. 
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international conferences, etc. Yet, it is pertinent to point out that, in contrast to 
some other member States like Spain or Germany, which have seen in European 
integration a way to redefine their identity and foreign policies, in the case of 
France, from de Gaulle to Sarkozy, the national control of defense and foreign 
policy matters has always been fiercely defended. French reticence to all transfer 
of national sovereignty in this policy area has always been clearer than in other 
member states, bar Britain. It was particularly visible during the negotiation of the 
Maastricht Treaty and its aftermath, with a keen insistence in maintaining its 
intergovernmental character. The Amsterdam Treaty added in 1997 the position 
of “High Representative of the CFSP”, but France, together with Britain, made 
sure its sphere of independent action was in fact very limited. All decisions in 
these matters had to be approved unanimously by the members of the EU, which 
ultimately limited its breadth and power. Despite the revision of the unanimity rule 
with the introduction of “constructive abstention” and “enhanced cooperation” by 
the Nice Treaty of 1999 and the creation of a Vice President of the Commission 
in charge of external relations of the EU by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 it 
appears that, for the time being, foreign policy-making remains one of the kingly 
functions of the member states, and France, together with the UK, is one of the 
key defenders of such principle.  
The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, which deals only 
incidentally with foreign policy, reserves for the Parliament6 the ratification of 
international treaties (art. 53), except when the President (art. 11) decides to do it 
by referendum, as for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 or the Constitutional Treaty 
of the EU in 2005. Yet, in practice, it distributed the responsibilities for 
International relations among the President of the Republic, who defines the 
broad orientation, the Prime Minister, who implements it; and the Parliament, 
which is normally a registry of international actions, except when it is compelled 
by the government to participate on important questions, like, for example, during 
the decision not to participate in the Iraq war. From the beginning though, the first 
President of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle, made foreign policy one of his 
                                                 
6
 The “Parliament” here means both chambers: the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat. 
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 6 
main priorities. In 1959, the President of the National Assembly Jacques 
Chaban-Delmas coined the expression “reserved domain” (domaine reservé) to 
describe a practice that was later adopted by all of de Gaulle’s successors: when 
it comes to national defense and foreign policy, the president sets forth the big 
ideas and makes the decisions, while the government abides by them. In times 
known as “cohabitation” (when the President of the Republic and the Prime 
Minister are from opposite sides of the political fence), the power of decision is 
shared (domaine partagé), but the preeminence of the role of the head of state 
remains paramount. So in contrast to most other member states, which are 
parliamentary democracies, the semi-presidential nature of Fifth Republic sets 
France apart from the rest in terms of the composition of the policy network 
involved in the formulation and conduction of foreign policy, which is more 
disaggregated and uncoordinated in other member states as Germany, for 
example (see chapter on Germany). 
  
 
  1. 2. Foreign policy towards Latin America 
 
Another conceptual issue that needs to be questioned for this analysis is 
how relevant is the notion of “Foreign Policy” towards “Latin America”? What has 
been France’s foreign policy towards Latin America since the beginning of the 
Fifth Republic? Is it fair to talk of only one Foreign Policy towards a region 
characterized by such a vast heterogeneity in political regimes, such a great 
diversity in conjectural situations, as well as economies, regions, and populations 
of such diverging scales?7 To this question must be added the issue of the 
“transatlantic triangle” (United-States-Europe-Latin-America). Even though Latin 
America is considered to be a secondary actor by France, the United States and 
Europe, all policies directed towards its countries must take into account the 
interactions that they all have with one another. In the time period studied here, 
                                                 
7
 Couffignal (Georges), « L’Amérique latine ou les Amériques latines ? », in Questions 
internationales, la Documentation Française, Paris, n°18, march-ap ril 2006. 
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French presidents have been successively confronted with the political initiatives 
of American leaders, from John F Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress” in 1961, to 
Ronald Reagan’s “Caribbean Basin Initiative” in 1982, and George Bush’s 
“Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” in 1990. 
It is equally relevant to question the use of the expression ‘European 
Foreign Policy.’ On one hand, Europe is confronted in Latin America with the 
same kind of diversity of situations. On the other hand, since Europe is not a 
unified actor on the international stage, can we identify any kind of foreign 
policy in any or all domains of international interactions? By analyzing in detail 
the diversity of policies towards Latin America elaborated and implemented by 
Brussels, we have determined that this type of conclusion was probably 
premature, for most policy areas8. In his work on the Europeanization of the 
French Foreign Policies towards Asia9, Reuben Y. Wong avoids the expression 
and prefers to use “Europe’s External Relations System” instead. In his research, 
he tries to understand the interactions between three important levels: the 
Foreign Policies of the member States, the external commercial relations and the 
CFSP10.  In this paper, we will follow his example by focusing our attention on 
those fields where Community interactions are evident, such as trade, 
development cooperation and “political dialogue”. 
 
 
  1.3. France’s relations with Latin America before 1958 
  
It is important for this analysis to point out that relations between France 
and Latin America are old, rich, and dense. The libertadores of Spanish colonies 
(José Artigas, Francisco de Miranda, Simon Bolívar, San Martín, General Sucre) 
were heavily influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution and Enlightenment 
                                                 
8
 Couffignal (Georges), « Les relations Union Européenne – Amérique latine : simple 
routine ou prolégomènes d’une politique étrangère européenne ? », in Couffignal (Georges), dir., 
Amérique latine 2010 : Une Amérique latine, toujours plus diverse, Paris, La Documentation 
Française, 2010. 
9
 Wong (Reuben Y.), The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy. France and the 
European Union in East Asia, Basingstonke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
10
  Ibid, p. 3. 
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philosophy. Most of them were also great admirers of Napoléon. They imported 
the civil code into the young republics they had contributed to build. The Brazilian 
constitution of 1889 was largely inspired by that of the French Third Republic. Its 
motto, « order and progress » was taken from Auguste Comte. During all of the 
XIXth century, these links continued to flourish through constant exchanges, 
notably due to French scientists’ (botanists, geographers, naturalists) continuous 
attraction to those countries, where they founded schools, faculties, and 
institutes. The elites of these young nations were completely afrancesadas. 
Thus, at the end of the XIXth century, France applied itself to present European 
Civilization to the elite as a model of cultural leadership. The French language 
was extremely fashionable and was taught almost everywhere. Authors, artists, 
architects and French theater were the reference. The bourgeoisie would travel 
to France for long retreats, while fallen leaders and overthrown dictators would 
find refuge there. It can be noted that for a long time, Latin America’s elites were 
engaged in a strong cultural relationship dependency with France. 
Politically, France was intensely engaged in the region where big power 
rivalries played out. More than once, it helped Latin Americans stand up against 
the ambitions of the British and the Americans in the region. The French 
Intervention in Mexico, between 1861 and 1867, decided by Napoléon III and 
intended to establish a Francophile empire to contain the emerging power of the 
United States, did not reverse this current of sympathy. The French were 
vanquished militarily and withdrew in February 1967, leaving Maximilian behind, 
who was condemned and executed.  This dramatic episode marked the end of 
French military presence in Latin America, but not of its political influence, which 
remained important, given that France still keeps three territorial possessions in 
the area: Martinique, Guadeloupe and the Guyanne. As will be explained below, 
this presence certainly has had some incidence in its policy towards Cuba on 
Human Rights. 
During the XXth century, these relations were strengthened, particularly in 
the field of cultural and artistic interactions. Most of the great Latin American 
novelists lived in France: Vicente Huidobro, Alejo Carpentier, Alfonso Reyes, 
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Octavio Paz,  Mario Vargas Llosa, Julio Cortázar, Gabriel García Márquez, 
Miguel Ángel Asturias, Pablo Neruda, César Vallejo, to name just a few. This 
once led Carlos Fuentes to declare « the ultimate homeland of a Latin American 
is France »11. Mario Vargas Llosa declared in the speech he gave upon the 
reception of the Literature Nobel prize on 7 November 2010:  
 
Pero, acaso, lo que más le agradezco a Francia sea el 
descubrimiento de América Latina. Allí aprendí que el Perú era parte de 
una vasta comunidad a la que hermanaban la historia, la geografía, la 
problemática social y política, una cierta manera de ser y la sabrosa 
lengua en que hablaba y escribía. Y que en esos mismos años 
producía una literatura novedosa y pujante. Allí leí a Borges, a Octavio 
Paz, Cortázar, García Márquez, Fuentes, Cabrera Infante, Rulfo, 
Onetti, Carpentier, Edwards, Donoso y muchos otros, cuyos escritos 
estaban revolucionando la narrativa en lengua española y gracias a los 
cuales Europa y buena parte del mundo descubrían que América Latina 
no era sólo el continente de los golpes de Estado, los caudillos de 
opereta, los guerrilleros barbudos y las maracas del mambo y el 
chachachá, sino también ideas, formas artísticas y fantasías literarias 
que trascendían lo pintoresco y hablaban un lenguaje universal. 
 
 
 
2. Historical overview of France’s relations with Latin America and the 
European Union 
 
2.1. From Charles de Gaulle to Georges Pompidou: Latin 
America as a critical arena for the French political strategy to 
overcome a bipolar world. 
 
When de Gaulle came to power in 1958, France still benefited from the 
positive historical image of the country dating from the XIXth century. During his 
presidency (1958-1969), Charles de Gaulle took particular notice of the region, 
which had contributed 300 of the 400 Comités de la France libre created in 
                                                 
11
 Virginie Baby-Collin, « Cultures et identités », in David Albrecht et alii, Amérique latine, 
CNED-SEDES, 2005, p. 30. 
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support of his action in 1940.12 In addition, he believed that Latin America offered 
the perfect opportunity to help France free itself from the bipolar imprisonment of 
the East-West conflict, and distance itself from the United-States. He condemned 
the 1965 American military intervention in the Dominican Republic, left NATO’s 
integrated command in 1966, and reinstated commercial relations with Cuba 
despite the hostility of the United States. Most notably, he went on a very long 
trip (from September 21st, to October 16th 1964) and visited ten South American 
countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil) while refusing to stop in Washington.13 In 
response to the French tradition of recognizing states while overlooking their 
internal affairs, all the state leaders of the countries he visited, many of whom 
were dictators or head of military juntas, warmly welcomed him. During these 
trips, he also delivered many speeches with international resonance. 
On one of these occasions, he elaborated upon the concept of latinité 
(latinity), possible vector of differentiation between Latin American countries and 
Washington. He systematically underlined the fact that France and the countries 
visited belonged to the same community of men who share linguistic roots, 
Catholicism as the dominant religion, a common history, common values and 
common civilizations, to which the United States did not belong. This idea of a 
cultural community had the effect of reinforcing French cooperation with Latin 
America in the artistic, linguistic, and cultural domains broadly defined. Yet, the 
notion of latinité was not always well received, particularly in countries such as 
Bolivia or Peru. But the support for the idea of latinity stemmed from the 
increasing decline of the French language, gradually being replaced by English 
as the elite language in Latin America. So he enacted a broad policy of 
“rayonnement culturel” to support the study of the language and culture of his 
country, and somehow promoted the idea that studying in France, could be seen 
                                                 
12
 Offroy (Raymond), « De Gaulle et l’Amérique latine », Espoir n°61, 1987. 
13
 He had previously made a triumphal trip to Mexico (16-19 March 1964) which 
appreciated his political stance of keeping distant both from the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and during which he gave a famous speech whith the phrase « Marchemos la mano en la 
mano » [« let’s wak hand in hand »] The video of this speech is available on the internet site of 
Fondation Charles de Gaulle. 
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as an act of resistance against American hegemony. According to Mathieu 
Trouvé, for de Gaulle, the concept of latinité could be reinforced by the existence 
of the EEC. At a speech delivered at the Maison de l’Amérique Latine in Paris in 
February 1961 de Gaulle declared:  
 
Les raisons psychiques et politiques d'une étroite entente et d'une 
croissante coopération entre la France et l'Amérique latine sont 
aujourd'hui plus fortes que jamais. D'autant plus, qu'en ce moment 
même, il se forme avec la France, à l'Occident de l'Europe, un 
groupement fécond et puissant d'États, Italie, Allemagne, Belgique, 
Hollande, Luxembourg, imprégnés comme elle du même esprit que jadis, 
l'Espagne et le Portugal transmirent au Nouveau Continent. Dès lors, 
pourquoi ne point espérer qu'on voie apparaître un jour, de part et 
d'autre de l'Atlantique, un monde latin uni et renouvelé ? 14 
 
De Gaulle’s political strategy was not as successful as he had hoped. Latin 
Americans remained skeptical of the Third Way (troisième voie) put forward by 
France. As his trip ended, Mexican, Colombian and Venezuelan leaders made a 
point to firmly reassert the ties that bound them to the United States15. Although 
the outcome of his trip was limited in political terms, nonetheless, it renewed an 
interest in cultural, scientific, technical, and diplomatic collaboration.16 
Besides, De Gaulle’s actions were decisive for the expansion of the 
Common Market to the agricultural sector in 1962 and the set up of the CAP, 
which absorbs, still today, more than 40% of the EU’s budget. This policy quickly 
became a major stumbling block for the development of relations between the 
EU and Latin America, especially with MERCOSUR in the 1990’s. In this respect, 
it is worth noting that France provoked one of the first major European crises in 
relation to the agricultural issue and voting in the Council, known as the “empty 
                                                 
14
 Quoted by Matthieu Trouvé, "Entre spectacle et mission. Le voyage du général de 
Gaulle en Amérique du Sud du 21 septembre au 16 octobre 1964",  Espoir n°130, 2002 .  
15
 Loaeza, Soledad, “La visita del general De Gaulle a México: El desencuentro franco-
mexicano”, Foro Internacional, v. XXXI, núm.1 (121), 1990, pp. 294-313. « Le voyage du général 
de Gaulle en Amérique latine : september 21- october 16, 1964 », Espoir n°114 (1998),  
16
 Chonchol (Jacques), Martinière (Guy), L'Amérique latine et le latino-américanisme en 
France, Paris, l'Harmattan, 1985. 
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chair crisis” in 196517. When the crisis was finally resolved in 1966 through the 
“Luxembourg compromise”, France had managed to make its Community 
partners accept most of its views both on the CAP, and more broadly, on voting 
rules across the EEC18.  This was a rather conspicuous instance of “upload”, as 
France imposed most of its preferences into an EU policy that had numerous 
consequences in Community life and in relations with Latin America. 
As will be explained in the following pages, these views had a long lasting 
impact in French foreign policy towards the region. In fact, up until Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s presidency, cultural politics were in the forefront of French diplomacy 
towards Latin America. Equally, the idea that France could, given certain 
conditions, represent a political ally against US hegemony, has lasted and was 
most visible during the Iraq war of 2003.19 French opposition to any trade deal 
between the EU and Latin America that upsets the CAP has also been a 
constant and durable feature. 
 
 
2.2. Giscard d’Estaing: adjusting priorities to power realities 
 
The presidencies of Georges Pompidou (1969-1974) and Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing (1969-1974) were notable by the absence of a well-defined political 
strategy towards Latin America. In terms of foreign policy, Georges Pompidou 
tentatively followed the steps of de Gaulle, although, in relation to the EEC, he 
adopted a less obstructionist stance, which allowed the first enlargement to take 
                                                 
17
 See the book that John Newhouse devoted to this crisis : 30 juin 1965, crise à Bruxelles, 
Paris, Armand Colin, 1968. 
18
 On De Gaulle’s European policy see Maillard Pierre, De Gaulle et l’Europe : entre la 
nation et Maastricht, Paris, Tallandier, 1995, ou à la monumentale somme de Edmond Jouve, Le 
général de Gaulle et la construction de l’Europe : 1940-1966, deux tomes, Paris, LGDJ, 1967, 
1850 p. 
19
 During the discussions in the UN Security Council that preceded the American led 
invasion of Iraq, the two Latin American countries that were present as non-permanent members, 
Mexico and Chile, found great relief from the pressure of the US, as France’s menace to veto the 
resolution removed the need for an explicit vote against. 
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place.20 Later on, a newly elected Valéry Giscard d’Estaing took a firm stand 
against his predecessors by affirming that France had become a mid-range 
power with limited influence.21 Giscard d’Estaing believed that the priority was to 
ensure a positive commercial balance with the region, and maintain political 
stability in the French territories located in, or adjacent to, the Caribbean. This 
has been a powerful reason behind France’s more pragmatic approach towards 
the issue of democracy and human rights in Cuba when compared to other 
members of the EEC, like Germany or Poland. Also, the fact that Martinique, 
Guadeloupe and Guyana – the furthermost regions of the EU - belonged to 
France allowed this country to be a member of the CEPAL.  
Concerned with French national interests and conscious of the diminishing 
voice given to France in the international concert, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing came 
up with the notion of North-South Dialogue in 1974, and organized in 1975 the 
first meeting of the world’s most industrialized countries (first known as the G6, it 
later grew to become the G8). Diplomatic French relations with Latin America 
sought to promote these initiatives, while continuing to develop the cultural 
diplomacy instigated by de Gaulle. It is important to underline that Giscard 
d’Estaing, while staying true to the tradition of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states, and maintaining good relations with the various regimes, 
helped France open its door to political refugees fleeing Latin America’s 
dictatorships, a move strongly supported by the Socialist Party (see next 
section). Preoccupied by the possible effects of the political instability in Central 
America and the possible chain reactions of the revolutionary mouvements there, 
Paris focused its resources on ways to stabilize the political situation of countries 
in order to insure a secure buffer zone surrounding the French Antilles.  
Moreover, retaining possessions and former colonies in the Caribbean was 
behind France’s strong support for the Lomé agreement between the EEC and 
the ACP countries signed in 1975, which gave preferential access for its former 
                                                 
20
 De Gaulle had vetoed twice British entry to the EEC : in 1962 and 1967. It was only after 
his departure that enlargement negotiations could proceed. They concluded with the accession of 
Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. 
21
 Ayache (Georges), « Puissance et influence internationale », Géoéconomie, n°37, Paris, 
2006. 
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colonies and those of Britain and the Netherlands’ agricultural exports to the 
Common Market, in clear discrimination of other Latin American countries, 
especially in Central America and the Caribbean. It could thus be argued that, 
together with the banana régime, the Lomé Convention was, in fact, another 
instance of French successful upload of its policy preferences into the EU’s trade 
and development policies. Clearly, this upload was possible because the French 
diplomats managed to frame their national interests in Community terms and, 
most crucially, because they were supported by other powerful member states, 
such as Britain and the Netherlands.  
In sum, during this period, France had less ambitious goals for its policy 
towards Latin America and a less confrontational profile within the EEC. Yet, it 
still managed to remain on the driving seat of those EEC policies that impinged 
upon relations with Latin America, and with Caribbean possessions in particular: 
trade and development. At that stage of European integration, these were the 
key policy areas managed by Brussels and everything else remained bilateral. 
So the mode of interaction between French and European policies towards Latin 
America in this period was mainly of uploading. 
 
 
2. 3. François Mitterrand’s European commitment and Latin 
America 
 
François Mitterrand initiated a decisive change, by scaling up interaction 
between European and French foreign policy towards Latin America. In 1985, 
with the support of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Jacques Delors, a 
prominent French socialist, was nominated president of the European 
Commission. This nomination confirmed France’s commitment to the 
construction of Europe and thereby broke away from de Gaulle’s tradition of 
keeping the EEC’s institutions at arms’ length. With Spain and Portugal’s entry in 
the EEC in 1986, Latin America progressively became integral to the process of 
constructing a European Foreign Policy. 
ha
ls
hs
-0
06
48
42
0,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 5
 D
ec
 2
01
1
 15 
As discussed above, before 1981, relations between France and Latin 
America were somewhat scarce, but the Socialist Party had a very active Latin 
American cell, which helped many Argentinean, Chilean, Uruguayan, and 
Brazilian individuals to take refuge on French soil. From the start of his term, and 
with the backing of his minister of Foreign Affairs, Claude Cheysson, François 
Mitterrand personally stayed in contact with many countries of Latin America, by 
visiting them or welcoming most of its leaders at the Elysée. He delineated three 
topics, which he deemed most pressing:  
1) The issue of political instability in Central America and the nature of the 
solutions to address it;  
2) The need to put into place a new policy of cooperation towards the Third 
World based on key countries such as Algeria, India and Mexico; 
3) The issue of human rights.22 
Mitterrand focused French foreign policy on certain countries (Argentina, 
Mexico, Chile, Cuba, Central America) but vacillated in the beginning between 
his socialist inclinations and his desire to make France one of the leader’s of the 
EEC. This oscillation manifested itself most clearly in his positioning towards 
Argentina, Mexico, and even more so, in Central America. France defended 
Argentina’s position to renegotiate its external debt23 with the EEC and the Club 
de Paris, but when the Falklands/Malvinas war broke out in May and June 1982, 
France stood next to Britain, as did all other EEC members. The Community 
decided to sanction Argentina and “imposed a package of economic sanctions, 
which included a total ban of arms sales to Argentina”.24 France then tried, 
without success, to mediate in the conflict between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom. In this way, it became clear that, during the period, Community 
cohesion took precedence over bilateral relations with far away countries like 
Argentina, and France accepted to “download” the EEC embargo which the 
                                                 
22
 Jouineau (Sophie), La politique extérieure de la France à l'égard de l'Amérique latine 
pendant le premier septennat de François Mitterrand, DEA thesis from the IEP in Paris, s.n, 1990 
23
 Stetsenko (Ala) et Lukina (Svetlana), « Política latinoamericana de Mitterrand » in 
America Latina, n°10 (1985), Moscow  
24
 Joakim Krentz, « Hard Measures by a Soft Power ? Sanctions Policy of the European 
Union 1981-2004 », Bonn International Center for Conversion, paper 45, 2005, p. 22 
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Thatcher government managed to extract from its Community partners, even 
though it tried to mend fences bilaterally –to no avail. 
Relations with Mexico illustrated another interesting way in which 
Community and French bilateral policies interacted. Mexico represented a key 
country within Miterrand’s Third-World political campaign, which also included 
Algeria and India, and he made sure to maintain strong ties with all of them. On 
the advice of his Latin American counselor, Régis Debray, France and Mexico 
signed in 1981 a joint declaration recognizing the Salvadorian guerilla, the Frente 
Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) as a legitimate political force 
that should be included in any attempt to solve the conflict in El Salvador, a move 
that certainly irritated Washington and other Latin Americans.25 As will be 
explained below, from that moment onwards, France opted for a multilateral 
approach to act jointly with its Community partners, in the framework of the 
nascent EPC.26 
The civil wars in Central America and the search for solutions to them were 
of great concern to François Mitterrand, as a socialist.27 Beyond that, as de 
Gaulle had expressed before him, France should try to step away from the East-
West mindset and find a way to replace military interventions - favored by Ronald 
Reagan, notably in his containment and roll back strategy - by political solutions. 
On that issue, France made it clear that it wanted to position itself as leader of 
Europe. But in these matters, French politicy evidenced various structural 
contradictions that weakened it. Nominating Régis Debray as a presidential 
advisor on Latin American Affairs was perceived as a provocation to many in 
other countries who did not appreciate the Che Guevara as much as he did28. As 
a consequence, the French-Mexican Declaration of August 28, 1981 was not 
                                                 
25
 “Declaración Conjunta Mexicano-Francesa sobre El Salvador”, Tlatelolco, 28 August 
1981, in Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico), Informe de Labores, 1981-1982. 
26
 Mexico also multilateralized its action in relation to Central America through the 
Contadora Group. 
27
 For the role of European Socialist parties in articulating the positions of Spain, France 
and Germany towards the Central American conflict, see Eusebio Mujal-León, “El socialismo 
europeo y la crisis en Centroamérica” in Foro Internacional, v. XXIV, n. 2, 1983, pp. 155-198. 
28
 Hermet (Guy), “Política francesa en América Latina” in Foro Internacional, Jan-Mar 
1986, Colegio de México, México, 385-398. 
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warmly welcomed by many political sectors inside France. Outside, in September 
2, 1981, eight countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Colombia) met in Caracas and adopted a 
Declaration “in response to the French-Mexican declaration,” in which they 
categorically rejected the intromission of a European country in their affairs.29 
Moreover, the (previously suspended) sale of arms to Nicaragua placed France 
on the side of the Soviet Union and Libya, the other two suppliers of the 
Sandinista army. Therefore, shortly afterwards, a clear de-radicalisation of 
French policy towards Central America became visible, and this was done by 
embracing joint action with other EEC partners, through the San José dialogue 
initiated in 1984. For France, as for other European partners, like Germany, it 
was easier to face Reagan’s bellicist attitudes in a multilateral fashion, rather 
than single-handedly or bilaterally. Thus, the articulation of a distinct political 
stance towards Central America became a catalyst for the reinforcement of the 
framework of EPC, the precursor of CFSP. So, instead of a U-turn to change an 
initially radical policy towards Central America, France, like other member states 
and Spain turned to the EPC.30 In this instance, rather than upload or download, 
it seemed that cooperation through EPC generated a “cross load” that moderated 
all EEC member state’s positions. 
Consequently, the EEC found itself thrust into the midst of the East-West 
conflict, and timidly suggested following a third option, supporting the Contadora 
Group’s arguments in favour of a regional solution to Central America’s conflicts. 
Ronald Reagan considered the arrival of the Sandinistas to power and the help 
that Cuba provided to them (and, as a matter of fact, to the Salvadorian 
insurgents of the FMLN) as the triggering forces behind the political uprising in 
Central America. In contrast, the EEC – with the determined backing of French 
diplomacy - brought its support to the Contadora Group. Created in 1983, it 
included Mexico, Panama, Venezuela as well as Colombia, and viewed the 
                                                 
29
 Marie Claude de Saint-Hilaire, « Amérique centrale : chronologie des évènements 1980-
1982 », Politique étrangère, vol 47 (2), 1982, p. 337. 
30
 Spain had not yet joined the EEC, but participated in the San José dialogue since 1982, 
when the Socialist party got to power with Felipe González. 
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archaic and unjust social structures of these countries as the main cause for 
armed conflict. Confronted with the military solution favored by the United States 
in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Europe suggested social and economic reforms 
and increased its developmental aid. Following Contadora, it supported the 
efforts of the Contadora Support Group created in 1985 (Argentina, Brazil, Peru 
and Uruguay). It adopted the same stance towards the Esquipulas Plan 
elaborated in 1987 by Oscar Arias, which eventually pacified the region.  
The European and French ideas to solve the Central American conflicts 
were therefore in complete opposition to those held by the United States. How 
did Latin Americans perceive these opposite political stances? While the French-
Mexican declaration was not well received, as previously mentioned, Europe’s 
support of the Contadora and Arias Plan – both encouraging of diplomatic 
independence in the region - were strongly welcome. The support of Europe was 
in fact essential to these countries. For the first time, they were not alone against 
the strictly bipolar perception of conflicts instigated by the Reagan administration. 
Moreover, as part of this process, in 1984, the EEC signed the San José 
Agreements with the countries of Central America, which allowed them to benefit 
from a number of commercial privileges. These agreements helped to restore the 
image of Europe in a region that had previously condemned the EEC’s trade 
protectionism and its support of Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas War. They also 
established that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both sides would meet up 
annually, which launched an ever-growing political relationship between Europe 
and Latin America. As a result, during the following decade, Europe became one 
of Latin America’s main economic partners, second only to the United States 
(see below). Thus, the 1980s were the first years to truly witness Europe’s entry 
on the Latin American stage since the Second World War. Equally, they marked 
the appearance of Latin America on the EEC agenda, beyond the banana regime 
and the Lomé Convention. Crucially, the Central American issue became a 
catalyst for the early development of EPC, that is, Community action beyond the 
economic realm. This decade also gradually ushered the emergence of a certain 
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diplomatic autonomy of Latin American States, banded together against the 
United States’ renewed impetus for interventionism in the area. 
Beyond Central America, it must be stressed that, under Mitterrand’s two 
terms, cultural diplomacy as well as scientific and technical cooperation 
continued to grow, both at the national and at the EEC level. In terms of funding, 
French bilateral cooperation with Latin America ranked third behind francophone 
Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, although Asia was already starting to take 
over Latin America. Moreover, cooperation was truly collaborative, not charitable: 
in the biggest countries similar projects were funded by both sides. An emphasis 
on cultural exchanges and the promotion of the French language continued to be 
supported by a dense network of educational establishments (33 bi-national 
middle and high schools), of about 250 Alliance Française committees (local 
centers teaching French), of several Cultural Centers and of two research 
institutions (in Mexico and Lima). At the EU level, Mitterrand promoted his former 
Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, to European Commissioner for North/South 
relations under the first Delors Commission, thus assuring a strong French 
imprint into EEC Relations with Latin America for the rest of the decade. It was 
under both Frenchmen leadership that regular consultations were established 
between the European Commission and the group of Latin American 
ambassadors in Brussels (known as GRULA). These lead to the publication of a 
common document in 1987 which outlined the technical and economic direction 
in which the relationship should develop,31 including a steep increase in EEC 
development funds for Latin America. It must be added though, that in this 
process of upload, the French were strongly supported by Spain, which joined 
the EEC in 1986. 
With regard to the political stance of promoting human rights defended by 
François Mitterrand, it must be noted that it did not extend to Cuba. On the one 
hand, France had expressed great sympathy for the feat of Fidel Castro, from the 
start, as his insistence on independence from the United States met that of De 
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 Roberta Lajous “Las Relaciones de México con Europa Occidental: 1982-1988”, Foro 
Internacional, v. XXX, núm. 3, 1990, pp. 567-573. 
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Gaulle, and carried widespread approval within public opinion. On the other 
hand, and in more pragmatic fashion, Paris never lost sight of its two Caribbean 
territories, Martinique and Guadeloupe, where the French Communist Party was 
well established. It was therefore important for Paris to maintain amicable 
relations with Fidel Castro to avoid any risks of destabilization in the French 
Antilles. 
In short, it could be argued that Mitterrand’s first decade as president 
coincided with France’s most intense relations with Latin America since 1945, as 
well as a real upgrade in the EEC’s agenda. France was a clear “uploader” of its 
policy preferences with regard Latin America, and especially with Central 
America, into EPC as much as EEC development policy. Indirectly, trade policy, 
which continued to discriminate in favour of ACP countries, and against Latin 
America, continued to be a result of French upload into the CAP. 
During the 1990s, the idea of a European policy towards Latin America 
made progress, but with France losing the driving seat. This is because EU 
foreign policy regarding Latin American came together through the conjunction of 
two events that diminished the relative weight of France: the 1986 adherence of 
Spain and Portugal to the EEC on the one hand (see chapter on Spain), and the 
1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall on the other.  The treading of the EEC/EU inside the 
“backyard” of the United States was possible partly because of the end of the 
Cold War, as an uncontested enthousiasm for free trade and democracy 
flourished among the three sides of this triangular relasionship. Indeed, this event 
took place at a time when authoritarian or dictatorial regimes in Latin America 
had gradually been replaced by democracies. The United States, which had 
centered its political interventions in Central American conflicts on the promotion 
of democracy, could only salute these new regimes and respect their will to 
create their own autonomous foreign policies. The EU and Latin America seized 
the opportunity. Thus, during Mitterrand’s second term, French influence on EU 
Latin America relations became less obvious, as other systemic factors and 
Spanish leadership took over. Indeed many European programs catering to Latin 
American issues still today owe their existence to the discussions held, and the 
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resolutions adopted, during these Iberoamerican summits promoted by Spain 
since 1991.32 Spanish officials in Brussels participated greatly in the increase of 
technical, economic, but also political exchanges set in place between the two 
regions. One of the first moves by the Spanish government in Brussels was to 
get Cheysson’s post for Abel Matutes. And the most prominent was Manuel 
Marin, Vice-President of the European Commission, decisively backed by its 
President Jacques Delors, who personally pushed through the establishment of 
the Río Process in 1999. It is also mostly because of the efforts of Spain with 
French support that, by the end of François Mitterrand’s second term in1993, 
Latin America had been declared, not unlike Southeastern Asia, a region of 
economic priority for Europe. 
 
 
2. 4. Jacques Chirac’s pragmatism. 
 
Though Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) followed the tradition started at the 
beginning of the Fifth Republic of cultivating Latin America as a “reservoir of 
votes” in multilateral fora, his political goals were also to promote French 
economic positions. While pursuing French involvement in the politics of the 
European Union, he left behind Mitterrand’s support for the supranational 
institutions, the Commission in particular, to push forward a more 
intergovernmental view of integration. The sympathy with which France was still 
regarded in Latin America seemed favorable to the elaboration of a new policy33,  
articulated around four priorities, of which the first two were elaborated in 
Brussels as a result of the launch of the CFSP since the Maastricht Treaty:  
- To reinforce the Rule of Law; 
- To reinforce the political dialogue; 
- To encourage the French companies to set up in Latin America; 
                                                 
32
 See for example Jarque (Carlos M.), Ortiz (Maria Salvadora), Quenan (Carlos), ed., 
América latina y la diplomacia de las Cumbres, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, Madrid, 
2009. 
33
 Drouhaud (Pascal), “Le retour de la France en Amérique latine”, Défense nationale, (53) 
11, Paris, 1997 (p.109-122). 
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- To continue bilateral and multilateral development cooperation.  
The most visible change in bilateral relations with Latin America was that 
Chirac reoriented the underlying purpose of French cultural policy by asserting 
that it must be at the service of expanding economic influence. It was therefore 
necessary to promote the teaching of French as a language of commerce and 
business. However, French cultural policies in Latin America appeared too 
inconsistent to really participate and support economic activities. Since the end of 
the Second World War, France had passively benefited from the favorable 
perception Latin Americans held towards European countries, and had never 
questioned its position as a soft power. France was, in fact, and still is, 
considered a country of great cultural breadth and will remain the country of the 
Enlightenment and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, the use 
of the French language has been associated to a certain idea of social 
excellence. Nevertheless, France is not associated with the notion of Modernity 
anymore: the United States has swiftly replaced it in that regard. In addition, 
Americans were becoming increasingly present in Latin America, through their 
universities and their scholarship policies. As a response, Jacques Chirac 
redefined the content of France’s cultural relations with Latin America, putting an 
emphasis on scientific exchanges, technical cooperation and the promotion of 
language in the economic sphere (notably by creating the position of 
“international volunteers” placed in French companies abroad). He actively and 
efficiently worked towards the recognition of cultural diversity in international 
instances. After organizing a meeting in Paris in June of 1996 with native Latin 
Americans, during which he underlined France’s commitment to support 
Indigenous Latin America, Chirac, used the “reservoir of votes” held by Latin 
American countries and Canada to get the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions adopted by UNESCO. 
At the EU level, France lobbied for the 2000 European-sponsored 
construction of a Common Area of Higher Education Latin America- Caribbean—
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EU (ALCUE) in order to reinforce academic exchanges34. This first initiative 
allowed the creation of other programs such as ALFA (the development of 
university networks between countries of both continents) and Alban (graduate 
scholarships allowing Latin American students to study in Europe). It was easy 
for France to “upload” this preference for privileging cultural and scientific 
cooperation with Latin America because it was a goal shared by many other 
member states, particularly Spain, Germany and the UK, and did not meet any 
opponents. Paradoxically, however, this increase in Europe’s visibility and 
potential on the academic scene allowed France to progressively disengage from 
bilateral scholarship programs, even though the number of European grants 
offered by the Alban program (now extinct) was far behind what was put forward 
by the United States (Fulbright), the United Kingdom (British Council) or Canada. 
In a way, it could be said that Frace “outsourced” this kind of cooperation to the 
EU. In any case, after ten years of existence, the results of the EU-LAC process 
remain rather limited, while cooperation in higher education and academic 
exchange is one of the few areas, which have yielded concrete, if not 
spectacular, results.  
It must be noted with regard to the establishment of the EU-LAC bi-regional 
relationship, that the institutional format adopted by “Rio Process” since 1999, 
was in line with French (and British) preferences regarding European Foreign 
Policy: an intergovernmental format where summit meetings of heads of state 
and government of both sides kept the lead of the process, side-lining the 
Commission and resisting the creation of any new organization. 
In the international political arena, it was notable how Jacques Chirac 
positioned himself in the direct line of action inherited from de Gaulle in relation 
to the United States: he brought his support to Latin American countries trying to 
assert their autonomy and sought their backing in the international arena. 
Accordingly, in 1997, France supported Bolivia in its campaign to have the 
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“principle of co-responsibility” in drug trafficking recognized.35 This was in direct 
opposition to the exclusively repressive policy of Americans to sanction solely the 
narcotic-producing countries, rather than both ends of the chain. The EU adopted 
a similar position shortly after, showing the French capacity to still upload their 
views into certain European initiatives, even against the US. In this case, as had 
happened during the Central American wars, acting as part of the EU gave 
France, as well as the others member states, more room for maneuver to hold 
positions that ran counter to those of the US. Other instances of this strategy 
were visible in the communiqués of the EU-LAC summits, which condemned the 
extraterritoriality of the Helms-Burton law, some of the excesses of the war 
against terrorism, and praised multilateralism as opposed to the unilateralism of 
the Bush administration36. In these cases, instead of Europeanization, acting 
through the EU seems to be the outcome of an instrumental calculation that uses 
the EU as an additional instrument available to French foreign policy. 
The most dramatic instance of Chirac’s will to maintain the independence of 
French foreign policy was his threat of veto to the UN Security Council resolution 
that would have legitimized the Anglo-American military intervention in Iraq, 
decided by George W. Bush in 2003. French diplomacy actively sought the 
support of Chile and Mexico during the UN’s Security Council meetings, and 
certainly represented an importat asset to sustain the difficult positioning of these 
countries. It has to be said, however, that in this particular (but immensely 
important) case, France even with the strong support of Germany, did not 
manage to “upload” its preferences at the European level. European unity 
completely broke down under a strongly divided opinion among member states 
and within member states. So, this time, it was France (and Germany) who 
represented an alternative for Latin Americans against US pressure, not the 
European Union as such, and, for once, neither Spain. 
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 On March 15, 1997, when touring South America, Jacques Chirac opposed American 
policy as he declared in La Paz that France recognized the principle of co-responsibility of 
consumption countries in the issue of drug-trafficking. 
36
 See for example : III Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe – Unión Europea, Declaración 
de Guadalajara, Mexico, May 2004, §§ 11,16,18 and 19. 
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On the economic front, the French government put into place many 
incentives to help French businesses expand in Latin America and, in particular, 
in the MERCOSUR region. In March 1997, Chirac spent nine days touring Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia accompanied by more than a hundred 
businessmen37. He clearly wanted to favor the development of economic 
relations with a region which represented two thirds of South America’s GDP. 
These enterprises greatly benefited from programs of privatization implemented 
in several countries, notably Argentina, where France became the biggest foreign 
investor. The French economic plan then focused on Brazil, which provided the 
incentive for many big French companies (such as EDF, BNP, Renault) to move 
to the region. Yet, at the EU level, France led the “protectionist” camp in all the 
free-trade negotiations with Latin American countries (Mexico, Chile) or regional 
groupings (MERCOSUR, Andean Community, Central America) that were 
initiated during this period. Always zealous to preserve the rural policy of the EU 
from the percieved threat of external competition, France has always been the 
most outspoken “uploader” of a tough EU negotiating position with third parties. 
Even with Mexico, whose agriculture does not represent a threat to anyone in 
Europe, France was concerned about the precedent that free trade negotiations 
between that country and the EU could set for others.38  And there is no doubt 
that the agricultural sector has been the main stumbling block to negotiations 
with MERCOSUR, still stalled after fifteen years.39 Yet, it has to be recognized 
that France has been an extremely successful “uploader” of CAP protectionism, 
because, behind its loud voice, lies a near consensus on the issue among EU 
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 « Chirac en voyage d'affaires en Amérique latine. Entamée demain au Brésil, la 
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members states, including those who want a closer relationship with Latin 
America, like Spain or Germany, or those who favour free-trade in general, like 
the Netherlands, and in some cases, even Britain.  
 
 
3. Recent developments with Nicolas Sarkozy 
 
  3.1. Political relations: Strong relations with Latin America’s 
emerging powers and a green light for Europe in the rest of the region 
 
In terms of foreign policy, Nicolas Sarkozy has managed to follow in the 
footsteps of his predecessors, while somehow breaking away from their legacy. 
On the one hand, continuity has been apparent in terms of the style adopted with 
regard to foreign relations issues, a style not dissimilar to that of de Gaulle. 
Sarkozy wants to hold the decisive role in the foreign policy realm. His way of 
governing, his desire to take action swiftly and to intervene in all domains, as well 
as his efforts to be visible to the media while being perceived as a problem-
solver, all flourish in the international sphere, a field devoid of any overarching 
governmental agency and prone to multiple crises. Catering to international 
relations has taken up a large segment of his schedule: in the first two years of 
his term, he was out of the country on official affairs more times than Jacques 
Chirac during his twelve years in power. 
On the other hand, Sarkozy has completely distanced himself from the 
Gaullist desire to break away from the United States. As a deputy during the time 
of the American intervention in Iraq, he was a strong partisan of France 
supporting the deployment. Since becoming President, he has reincorporated 
France in NATO’s integrated command in 2008, and has relentlessly worked to 
be recognized as a privileged partner by the US (first by George W. Bush, then 
by Barack Obama), albeit with limited results. In breaking with de Gaulle, Giscard 
d’Estaing, Mitterrand and Chirac, all of whom sought international support in their 
attempt to change the existing international order, Sarkozy is preoccupied only 
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by the action taken by France (and by him in particular) within the international 
sphere. This philosophy informed Sarkozy’s many initiatives during the French 
presidency of the European Union in 2008, i.e. to solve the Georgian crisis, the 
creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (the objectives of which remain 
unclear), or his activism to ratify the Lisbon Treaty. 
In this context, Latin America has only occasionally been perceived as a 
critical arena for France in the international order, depending on whether 
particular projects are deemed important. With no more overall international 
ambition, the strategy of the “reservoir of votes” has slowly dissipated and been 
replaced in practice, by the concern about helping French companies succeed 
outside the country. This is why now France concentrates its efforts towards a 
handful of emerging countries considered a priority in the region: Brazil and 
Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia. Because of 
their economic scope and their geopolitical position, Brazil and Mexico are 
countries that are capable of exercising a considerable regional, even 
international, influence. Brazil, Mexico and Argentina are members of the G20, 
which has become a privileged vehicle for discussing many international issues 
since the financial crisis of 2008 broke out. Mexico is also a member of the 
OECD. This privileged relationship with Brazil and Mexico translates into the 
creation of a large number of programs that do not necessarily connect with EU 
policy, but rather a wide variety of multilateral or bilateral institutions. 
On the French-Brazilian front, the UNAIDS program was launched by the 
General Assembly of the UN in September 2006, under a joint initiative by 
Presidents Lula and Chirac.40 Efforts were made to transform the UN’s diverging 
positions within its program for the environment (United Nations Environment 
Program -UNEP), and Brasilia backed France’s candidacy to the Amazon 
Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO). France is also a strong proponent of 
Brazil’s permanent entry in the United Nations’ Security Council.  
                                                 
40
 This program works to eradicate a variety of pandemics (aids, malaria, tuberculose).  It 
has been funded by taxing plane fares. The first results of UNITAID are very encouraging. 
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In relation to Mexico, a “High level Group”, composed by 15 French and 
Mexican personalities (namely, high-ranking businessmen and preeminent 
intellectuals), was created in 2007 with the goal to revive bilateral relations, 
particularly on the economic front. Eighteen agreements were elaborated to 
confront international issues, from world governance, to climate change, and to 
revive French-Mexican cooperation in key areas (security, health, research, 
education, training, sustainable development). During Sarkozy’s visit in 
December 2008, a “strategic partnership” between France and Mexico was 
adopted to reinforce the cooperation and dialogue. Yet, his insistence that 
Mexico should participate actively in peacekeeping operations did not go down 
well among the ruling and chattering classes. 
 
 
3.2. Economic relations and development cooperation 
 
Economically, France is very involved in both countries with 350 French 
companies located in Mexico and 400 in Brazil, 35 of which belong to the CAC 
40 (French stock exchange index). Brazil is France’s number one commercial 
partner in Latin America. In Mexico though, France owns only about 1% of the 
market share, a number that has not changed in several years, while Asian 
imports are gaining traction. As a supplier, France ranks twelfth behind the 
United States, but also China, Japan, Korea, and is fourth in the European 
ranking, behind Germany, Italy, and Spain. 
In terms of cooperation, the contribution of France’s Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs (MAEE) to Brazil reached 3.9 million Euros in 2008 (excluding 
schools), and Mexico receiving 2.7 million in 2009. These two countries are the 
only ones in the region which have not had their cooperation budgets reduced 
during the past years. In both countries, the priority is research and technological 
innovation (France is Brazil’s second scientific partner behind the US) as well as 
technical cooperation. In Brazil, the governmental prioritizes focus on social 
policies, small-scale sustainable agriculture, and state reform. In Mexico, the 
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focus is on the modernization of public institutions, most pointedly, in police 
cooperation and the war against organized crime (scientific police, training for the 
federal police) and of public administrations (training at the École Nationale 
d’Administration (ENA) of future public servants, reinforcement of territorial public 
functions). In the case of Brazil, France is working on the definition of a new kind 
of partnership concerned with multilingualism and cultural diversity, while in 
Mexico it focuses primarily on health (lab research and training). In conclusion, 
cultural, scientific and development cooperation with both these countries is 
important. 2005 was the year of Brazil in France, 2009 of France in Brazil, while 
2011 should have been the year of Mexico in France.41 
This shift towards bilateralism has been accompanied by a lack of interest 
in regional multilateralism, illustrated by Sarkozy’s cancellation of his participation 
in the Fifth EU-LAC Summit only weeks before it took place in Lima (May 2008). 
Latin American countries were disappointed by this late cancellation, which they 
interpreted as a sign that France held little interest in the region. The Madrid 
summit of May 2010 confirmed this: Sarkozy spent less than half a day. He was 
only interested in meeting the presidents of Brazil and Chile. It must be noted, 
however, that this loss of interest in the bi-regional summits is not exclusive to 
France, as the process has yielded poor results. Since the Vienna summit in 
2006, the EU, like France, has been abandoning the idea of negotiating free-
trade agreements with regional blocks in Latin America, in favor of bilateral 
agreements with particular countries.42 
While it was promoting bilateralism with a few countries, France participated 
very actively in setting up European programs of cooperation with Latin America, 
                                                 
41
 On February 15, 2011, the Mexican government decided to withdraw from all the 
activities scheduled, after Nicolas Sarkozy decided to dedicate this year to Florence Cassez, a 
French woman condemned to 60 years of prison for complicity in kidnapping, and whom Mexico 
refused to extradite. See Georges Couffignal, « L’année du Mexique en France. Un gâchis qui 
aurait pu être évité », Le Monde, 22 février 2011. 
42
 For more than 15 years, the EU had as apriority to negotiate Free Trade agreements with Latin 
America’s regional groupings, MERCOSUR, CAN, MCCA… The EU signed in 2000 a deal with Mexico and 
in 2002 with Chile. After the disintegration of the Andean Community, it has opened negotiations with Peru 
and Colombia. Despite the unchanged preference to negotiate block by block, the EU cannot fail to notice 
the failure of its policies on the matter, as the only agreement of this sort, with Central America, was signed 
as late as 2010. Sberro (Stephan), « Existe-t-il une relation stratégique entre l’Amérique Latine et 
l’Europe ? », Problèmes d’Amérique latine, 66/67, fall/winter 2007. 
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trying to “upload” its policy preferences. With Spain, it headed the Eurosocial 
program, to promote social cohesion in Latin America. The program facilitates 
the exchange of knowledge between public administrations in the fields of justice, 
education, employment, taxation, and health in order to reinforce managerial 
institutions of public policies and therefore reinforce social cohesion43. In this 
case, French uploading has been successful, since the promotion of social 
cohesion is a policy objective widely shared among EU members and the 
European Commission. However, it has been difficult to give it concrete meaning 
in relation to Latin America, given the meager funds dedicated to it, so the results 
in this area have been rather scarce. 
Similarly, France has taken several steps towards launching a EurocLima 
program, which strives to limit the gas emissions of Latin American countries by 
helping them to acquire tools to fight climate change. Yet, in this stance, France 
was confronted with both the reluctance of the European Commission to put forth 
large amounts of funds into the program and the relative disinterest of Latin 
American countries in the matter. In fact, most of them (as it was made apparent 
during the 2009 Copenhagen Summit) consider that climate change is, first and 
foremost, the responsibility of developed countries. 
Despite these specific attempts to influence EU policy towards Latin 
America, the general trend today, is that France follows the European Union lead 
when it comes to dealing with policymaking towards the region as a whole. This 
decision has been taken at the highest level, despite the constant effort of certain 
high-ranking officials of the MAEE that deal with the region. Apart from Mexico 
and Brazil, the amounts awarded through bilateral cooperation have been 
decreasing rapidly (more than 30% from 2008 to 2010). Cooperation policies are 
left to the European Union, which allows the President to more pointedly focus on 
actions that enhance his media visibility – for example, France sought to position 
itself as a mediator between Colombia and Venezuela in order to obtain the 
                                                 
43http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional 
cooperation/eurosocial/index_fr.htm. 
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liberation of Ingrid Betancourt - and to maintain strong bilateral relations with a 
few emerging countries considered as a priority. 
 
 
  3. 3. Changes in the administrative structure  
 
These developments are particularly clear when observing the structure of 
the MAEE, on the one hand, and the French diplomatic presence on the other. 
The Direction d’Amérique of the MAEE, which has competences over the 
countries of both South and North America, is linked to the French Permanent 
Representation in Brussels regarding the sectorial dossiers which are treated by 
the Commission, or those in which France has positions that it wants to have 
adopted at the EU level (upload). However, the programs launched by the 
various DG’s of the Commission towards Latin America are not really 
coordinated with the MAEE’s. Brussels could thus have cooperation programs 
with certain countries in Latin America (for example in the field of higher 
education or of State reform), while France develops similar programs in the 
same fields without any real coordination between them. This is a common issue 
in the field of cooperation where competencies are shared between the EU and 
the national level. Having said that, most of the time, France relies on the EU for 
the essential part of its cooperation policy, except for the Mexican and Brazilian 
cases, or in very particular and politically sensitive cases, like Cuba and Haiti. As 
to linguistic aspects of cooperation policy, which is strictly national, most actions 
are delegated to the Alliance Française, an agency created at the end of the 
XIXth century and with a large degree of autonomy, which has antennae all over 
Latin America. Last, in the field of development cooperation, it must be noted 
that, an institution created to act in Africa and former French colonies, the 
Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has started operating in Latin 
America and the Caribbean very recently.44 
                                                 
44
 cf. Quenan (Carlos) et Velut (Sébastien), (dir.), Les enjeux du développement en 
Amérique latine, Paris, AFD-Institut des Amériques, 2011. 
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Retrenchment from the region is visible in the structure of diplomatic 
postings. Their staff is now very limited, except for the two countries considered 
as « strategic », as are indeed their budgets. This evolution is not unique to Latin 
America. In 2009, the MAEE introduced a classification of embassies, dividing 
the world in four categories, in order of importance. None in Latin America is in 
the first category. Mexico and Brazil are in the second, while the rest are in the 
third and fourth categories, which means they are endowed with very limited 
resources. These changes are the result of a general rationalization of French 
public administration that has touched upon all Ministries (the RGPP,  Réforme 
générale des politiques publiques), as well as a major internal reorganization of 
the MAEE. Another source of pressure for change has been the increase in 
France’s participation in the fiduciary funds of multilateral and EU programs, 
which come out of the MAEE budget, thus leaving ever fewer money for bilateral 
action.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In accordance with our analytical framework, this review of the evolution of 
French foreign policy towards Latin America in relation to Europe shows that the 
region has never been considered a priority for French diplomacy, and keeps on 
declining, except for a couple of “emerging” powers. For a very long time, Latin 
America could have been a strong supporter of France’s efforts to build a new 
world order (by changing the bipolar rationale, by becoming a spokesman to the 
third-world, by encouraging the emergence of a multipolar stage, etc.), but this 
never quite worked out, apart from very particular instances, like the conflict in 
Central America during the 1980s, and the discussions in the UN Security 
Council previous to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
In the early years, Europe was perceived as a potential amplifier for the 
ambitions of France. At the time, the French diplomatic apparatus was directed 
towards having its positions adopted by European authorities (upload), as well as 
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by the Latin American countries (!). Today though, things have changed. France 
has abandoned the instrument of “cultural diplomacy” on the international scene, 
and any ambitions of cooperation towards the region as a whole have been 
relinquished to the European Union’s authority, and the Spanish who lead them.  
In short, France now participates in the initiatives decided by Brussels 
(download) and focuses its foreign policy efforts on the few countries it deems 
politically and economically relevant in the emerging new world order, as do 
other member states like Germany or the UK, as result of declining power, 
resources and influence on the world stage. 
This chapter has identified four distinct periods of French relations with 
Latin America, over which, the EEC/EU role has varied. The first period, with De 
Gaulle, was basically one of uploading French trade and cooperation interests 
into the nascent EEC, thus having great influence over the latter’s relation to 
Latin America. The President himself carefully cultivated the rest of the 
relationship bilaterally. The second period, with Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing 
was still of French upload into the EEC, facilitated by a less confrontational –if 
still strongly intergovernmental- approach to European integration. The third 
period, that of Mitterrand, represented the highest point of relations between 
France, the EU and Latin America, especially visible in the rapprochement that 
took place around the San José process. French commitment to European 
integration ensured that this country had enormous influence in the setting up of 
the nascent EU Foreign Policy towards the region. The last period, that of 
Jacques Chirac, set general trends that continue still today: a tendency to 
disengage with the region, except for a couple of important countries, while 
leaving everything else to the EU. However, Chirac still used the EU as an 
instrument when this was suitable and was key in establishing the EULAC 
strategic partnership in a multilateral and intergovernmental framework. Sarkozy, 
in contrast, seems less interesting in using the EU to pursue French interests 
(upload) and more prone to leave to it anything that it does not consider a 
priority, in what looks more like a sort of outsourcing.      
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This successful French “upload” of its policy preferences in a policy area, 
which is apparently not directly related to Latin America or “indirect upload”, has 
indeed been an important obstacle in the development of further links between 
the two regions, despite the fact that it is favored in other influential policy areas, 
like diplomacy, industry and culture. This clash between the “global” and the 
“sectorial” logics that articulate French views in the EU,45 is present in other 
member states as well in relation to Latin America, notably Spain and Germany. 
 
 
Revised by L. Ruano and G Couffignal on 04.10.2011 
(11855 words) 
                                                 
45
 Christian Lequesne, Paris-Bruxelles : Comment se fait la politique européenne de la 
France, Paris, Sciences Po, 1993, p. 24. 
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